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NOTE
Holding Producers and Distributors
Liable for the Harms of Sexually
Violent Pornography Through Tort
Law
INTRODUCTION
As awareness of pornography's' harm has grown, attempts have
been made to hold producers and distributors of pornography liable
for the specific harms caused by their products.2 In one of the
most famous examples, Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin 3 proposed a model anti-pornography Ordinance ("Ordi-
nance") 4 that was adopted by the Minneapolis 5 and Indianapolis
City Councils.6 The Ordinance created a civil cause of action
1. Pornography has been defined in many ways. Under current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, pornography is differentiated from obscenity, which is unprotected by the
First Amendment. Some pornography is unprotected, such as child pornography, while
other pornography constitutes protected speech. This Note addresses the regulation of
sexually violent pornography. It does not address the regulation of non-violent erotic
literature, art or sexual aids.
2. Congress, for example, has proposed the Pornography Victims Compensation Act
of 1992, S. 1521, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Massachusetts, California, Missouri and
Illinois have also considered comparable bills. Illinois, however, is the only state to enact
such legislation. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-18.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993). See also
Marianne Wesson, Girls Should Bring Lawsuits Everywhere... Nothing Will Be Corrupt-
ed: Pornography as Speech and Product, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 845, 849-51 (1993) (dis-
cussing the Pornography Victims Compensation Act).
3. Catharine A. MacKinnon is a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law
School. Her books include ONLY WORDS (1993), TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989) and FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). Andrea
Dworkin's books include WOMAN HATING (1984), RIGHT-WING WOMEN (1983) and PORNOG-
RAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981).
4. See infra part III for a complete discussion of the Ordinance. The Ordinance is
reprinted infra App. A.
5. MINNEAPOLS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES RELATING To CWIL RIGHTS, fit. 7, chs. 139,
141 (Jan. 5, 1984).
6. INDIANAPOLIS, IND., GEN. ORDINANCE No. 24 (May 1, 1984). This ordinance was
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against producers and distributors of pornography. In order to
recover, plaintiffs were required to prove that they were harmed by
specific pornographic materials. 7 However, in American Booksell-
ers Ass'n v. Hudnut,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the Ordinance was unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.9 The Supreme Court affirmed this decision
in a memorandum opinion.
The proposed Federal Pornography Victims Compensation Act
of 1992 was another attempt to regulate pornography.' 0 This Act
attempted to grant people who were injured by another's viewing
of obscenity or child pornography a federal cause of action against
the producers and distributors of the material." Although Congress
did not pass the bill, a comparable law was passed in Illinois.12
amended by GEN. ORDINANCE No. 35 (June 15,1984).
7. Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography and Equali-
ty, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 24 (1985). See Ordinance, infra App. A § 5(1).
8. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
9. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 332-34. For further discussions of the Ordinance as well as
other attempts to regulate pornography, see generally Deana Pollard, Regulating Violent
Pornography, 43 VAND. L. REV. 125, 154-59 (1990) (proposing an ordinance that would
be constitutionally valid); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986
DuLE L.J. 589, 602-08 (suggesting that pornography is low-value speech and as such the
harms it causes justify its regulation); Wesson, supra note 2, at 851-52 (defining "new
hard core" pornography that falls outside of First Amendment protection so that it could
be regulated, and proposing civil actions).
10. S. 1521, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The proposed Act was originally intro-
duced in 1991 as Subtitle C to S. 472. The pertinent section of the amended bill reads:
(a) CAUSE OF ACTION-A victim of a sex offense or a guardian, immediate
family member, or estate of such a victim may bring a civil action in a United
States district court or a State court against a producer, distributor, exhibitor,
renter, or seller of obscene material or child pornography that affects interstate
or foreign commerce to recover damages suffered as a result of the sex offense.
Id. § 4(a).
11. Id.
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-18.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993). This law provides in
pertinent part:
Civil Liability. (a) If any person has been convicted of any offense defined in
Section 12-13 [criminal sexual assault], 12-14 [aggravated criminal sexual
assault], 12-15 [criminal sexual abuse], or 12-16 [aggravated criminal sexual
abuse] of this Act, a victim of such offense has a cause of action for damages
against any person or entity who, by the manufacture, production, or wholesale
distribution of any obscene material which was possessed or viewed by the
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The Illinois statute is the only law to offer women redress, outside
the workplace, for the harms of pornography.
Redress is available, however, for the harms caused by pornog-
raphy posted in the workplace under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). 13 Under Title VII, posting pornography
in the workplace has been held to contribute to a "hostile working
environment" in violation of a plaintiffs civil rights. 14 Even por-
nography that is protected by the First Amendment can be regulat-
ed in the workplace to the extent that it constitutes a means of
discrimination by an employer.
!5
Currently, Title VII, the Illinois statute, and the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress offer women limited relief for
the harms of pornography.1 6 While Title VII successfully offers
redress to women based on a hostile working environment,
MacKinnon and Dworkin unsuccessfully tried to base redress on a
"hostile living environment." They failed because their Ordinance
inadequately protected First Amendment rights by prescribing a
specific way of thinking of women. The challenge in broadening
the protection of women from the harms of sexually violent por-
nography, therefore, is to tailor a remedy that will both provide
relief to women for their "hostile living environment" and simulta-
neously guarantee First Amendment rights. This Note proposes tort
remedies for victims of sexually violent pornography that permit
the victims to sue producers and distributors of the material. Al-
person convicted of the offense, proximately caused such person, through his
or her reading or viewing of the obscene material, to commit the violation of
Section 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, or 12-16....
Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988). Title VII bars employment discrimi-
nation based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Ross v.
Twenty-Four Collection, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1547 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 873
(11 th Cir. 1989); Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985).
14. Robinson, 760 F. Supp.. 1486.
15. Id.
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-
18.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990);
Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Twyman v. Twyman,
855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993); Young v. Stensrude, 664 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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though the sexually violent pornography may be protected by the
First Amendment, 7 application of the "secondary effects" theory
would allow both the regulation of this speech and the application
of tort remedies.
Part I of this Note discusses the specific harms caused by por-
nography, including those that occur in the workplace. Part II
reviews cases brought under Title VII to rid the workplace of por-
nography, demonstrating an effective, though limited, remedy that
women have utilized to fight pornography. Part III analyzes the
MacKinnon-Dworkin Ordinance, including discussions of
MacKinnon and Dworkin's theory behind the Ordinance, as well
as the Hudnut case. This part also addresses the unconstitutionality
of the Ordinance under the First Amendment. Part IV examines
various ways to hold producers and distributors of sexually violent
pornography liable for the resulting harms under traditional tort
theories, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, negli-
gence and strict liability. This part also discusses a First Amend-
ment theory on which to base these proposed tort remedies. This
Note concludes that permitting tort actions will protect sexually
violent pornography to the extent required under the First Amend-
ment but will nevertheless force producers and distributors of sexu-
ally violent pornography to compensate victims for the harms per-
petrated against them.
I. RECOGNIZING THE HARMS OF PORNOGRAPHY
Pornography harms women from all walks of life.' 8 Women
are coerced and brutalized into making pornography, 9 women are
forced to act out these violent scenes in their bedrooms, 20 women
in the workplace are subjected to it,2' and women are the victims
17. If the material is obscene there would be no First Amendment objections to suing
under the proposed tort remedies. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
(defining obscenity).
18. Pornography also harms men and children. This Note will focus on the harms
to women because the primary victims of sexually violent pornography are women.
19. See infra part I.A.
20. See infra notes 37-39, 50-52, 56-59 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 53-55, 61-69 and accompanying text.
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of the increased sexual violence it causes.22 The harms of sexually
violent pornography are slowly being recognized by the judicial
system,23 as well as federal and state legislatures. 24
A. Harms Suffered by Women Used to Produce Pornography
Numerous men and women testified before the 1986 Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography (the "1986 Commission")25
about the harms inflicted on the women who appear in pornograph-
26ic movies and magazines. For example, a man who claimed to
have been involved in the making of over 100 pornographic films
testified that female participants were forced to perform anal sex
while crying out in pain.27 Another woman who testified described
how women were tortured and "suffered permanent physical inju-
ries to answer publisher demands for photographs depicting sado-
masochistic abuse. 28
Linda Marchiano, 29 a pornography star, described the torture she
experienced, stating that she was "forced through physical, mental,
22. See infra part I.B.
23. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (stating that "[w]e accept the premises of this legisla-
tion. Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate
status of women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home,
[and] battery and rape on the streets"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1505 (M.D. Fla. .1991) (concluding that the presence of nude pictures in the
workplace creates and contributes to a sexually hostile working environment); Arnold v.
City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853, 858, 867 (E.D. Okla. 1985) (concluding that the
plaintiffs physical and mental problems were a direct result of the sexual harassment she
experienced at work, which included the posting of pictures of nude women).
24. See supra note 2.
25. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEPT. OF J.ESTIE, FINAL REPORT
(1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. There have been two official reports on pornography
in the United States, one in 1986, the FINAL REPORT, and one in 1970, PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY (1970) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REPORT]. The 1986
Commission held hearings in various cities and also considered testimony from the hear-
ings in Minneapolis regarding the MacKinnon-Dworkin Anti-pornography Ordinance.
26. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 767.
27. Id. at 773-74 (citing Los Angeles Hearing, Vol. 1 81).
28. Id. at 787-88.
29. Marchiano is known to pornography viewers as Linda Lovelace, the character she
portrayed in the pornographic movie Deep Throat.
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and sexual abuse ...often at gun point" to perform during the
filming of Deep Throat.30 For example, she was "beaten ...
kicked... and bounced off of walls" while others watched without
offering help. 3 Another woman, who was forced into prostitution
and the production of pornography, testified that the pornographers
would ignore her tears as they positioned her body to mimic the
women in pornographic pictures.32 Still another woman testified
that on the night her stepfather filmed her for a pornographic mov-
ie, he tortured her both physically and sexually because she "did
not perform adequately enough to be convincing. ,33  The 1986
Commission concluded that pornography harms the women who are
coerced into making it.34 However, the negative effects of pornog-
raphy are not limited solely to the women participating in the pro-
duction of pornography, but are felt by women throughout soci-
ety.3
5
B. The Effects of Pornography on Other Women
One of the most harmful effects of pornography is "a general
increase in sexual violence directed against women., 36 A women's
shelter wrote to the 1986 Commission about a woman who was
forced to act out scenes from her husband's pornographic maga-
zines.37 She was stripped, bound, gagged and then raped by a ger-
man shepherd.38 Another woman reported that she had been raped
30. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 794-95 (citing Public Hearings before Minneapo-
lis City Council, 2d Sess. 45-47 (Dec. 1983)).
31. Id. at 787 (citing Public Hearings before Minneapolis City Council, 1st Sess. 47,
49 (Dec. 1983)).
32. Id. at 784-85 (citing Washington, D.C., Hearing, Vol. I 179-82).
33. Id. at 787 (citing Washington, D.C., Hearing, Vol. II 262).
34. Id. at 1005. Coercion itself is a problem, and people who force women into
performing sexual acts are also subject, when applicable, to assault, battery and rape laws.
35. See Angela A. Liston, Pornography and the First Amendment: The Feminist
Balance, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 415, 421-24 (1985).
36. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 597; see also Liston, supra note 35, at 422 (discussing
the negative effects of exposure to pornography).
37. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 790-91 (citing Letter from Donna Dunn's Wom-
en's Shelter, Rochester, to the 1986 Commission).
38. Id.
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repeatedly by a man who told her that if she did not recreate the
depictions in his pornographic magazines he would "beat and kill
her.", 39
In the United States, the mass circulation of pornography is
closely correlated with incidences of reported rapes.4° In a series
of studies, Edward Donnerstein, a professor of Communications at
the University of California at Santa Barbara, found that violent
pornography can increase aggression against women.41 In another
1981 study, Neil M. Malamuth, a professor of Communications at
the University of California at Los Angeles, and James V.P. Check,
a professor of Psychology at York University in Canada, concluded
that media portrayals of women had detrimental effects on men's
attitudes about violence against women.42 The study revealed that
men who were exposed to rape scenes in which the woman was
portrayed as enjoying herself were more accepting of sexual ag-
gression and wife battering.43  In a 1988 study, Edward
Donnerstein, writing this time with Daniel Linz, a professor of
Communications at the University of California at Santa Barbara,
and Steven Penrod, a professor of Psychology and Law at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota, found that men who viewed sexually violent
films and then viewed a rape trial were much less sympathetic to
the rape victim and had lower levels of rape empathy. 44
Testimony before the 1986 Commission and the 1986 Commis-
39. id. at 774 (citing Minneapolis City Council, 2d Sess. 14 (Dec. 1983)).
40. See Baron & Straus, Sexual Stratification, Pornography and Rape in the United
States, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 53, 78-79 (Neil M. Malamuth & Edward
Donnerstein eds., 1984).
41. Edward Donnerstein, Its Effect on Violence Against Women, in PORNOGRAPHY AND
SEXUAL AGGRESSION (Neil M. Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein eds., 1984); see Pollard,
supra note 9, at 130. But see Pollard, supra note 9, at 127 (noting disputes about the
exact findings of the research); Wesson, supra note 2, at 866-67 (noting that Daniel Linz
and Edward Donnerstein clarified their views, stating that it is the violence of the materi-
als rather than the sexual explicitness that makes it dangerous).
42. James V.P. Check & Neil M. Malamuth, TheEffects of Mass Media Exposure
on Acceptance of Violence Against Women: A Field Experiment, 15 J. RES. PERSONALITY
436 (1981).
43. id.
44. Edward Donnerstein et al., Long Term Exposure to Violent and Sexually Degrad-
ing Depictions of Women, 55(5) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 758 (1988).
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sion's conclusions offer further insight into the influence of por-
nography on its viewers. One man, who had kidnapped, sexually
abused and murdered five boys, wrote that "[p]ornography wasn't
the only negative influence in [his] life but its effect ... was dev-
astating."45 He "lost all sense of decency and respect for humanity
and life."46 Six adolescent boys, who used a pornographic maga-
zine's pictorial outlay which depicted a rape scene, gang-raped a
young girl in the woods near their housing development.47
The 1986 Commission stated:
In evaluating the results for sexually violent material, it
appears that exposure to such materials (1) leads to a great-
er acceptance of rape myths and violence against women;
(2) have [sic] more pronounced effects when the victim is
shown enjoying the use of force or violence; (3) is arousing
for rapists and for some males in the general population;
and (4) has resulted in sexual aggression against women in
the laboratory.48
They concluded that "[ilt is clear that the conclusion of 'no nega-
tive effects' advanced by the 1970 Commission is no longer tena-
ble. "
49
The testimony of many women before the 1986 Commission
revealed how they were forced to recreate scenes from pornograph-
ic magazines and movies. One woman testified that from the age
of three, her father kept an easel by his bed on which he would pin
pornographic scenes from magazines. 50 He would tell her that this
was what she was going to learn that day.5' Another woman testi-
45. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 794 (citing Anonymous Letter to the 1986 Com-
mission).
46. id.
47. Id. at 777 (citing Pornography speech presented to the National Women Judges
Conference, Oct. 12, 1986, submitted to the 1986 Commission).
48. Id. at 1005. See generally, Pollard, supra note 9, at 133-35. The "rape myth"
referred to in the text describes the myth that women who are raped either enjoy it or ask
for it. Eric Hoffman, Feminism, Pornography and Law, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 512
(1985).
49. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 1031.
50. Id. at 782 (citing Chicago Hearing, Vol. II 95).
51. id.
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fled that her husband had forced her to perform violent sexual acts
while he leafed through his pornographic pictures. 52 The Porno-
graphic Resource Center was called by a woman in May of 1984
to report that her employer had called her into his office, forced her
to the floor, ripped her dress and forced a gun into her vagina.53
A pornographic picture on the employer's lunchroom wall showed
a woman sucking a gun.54 Finally, a woman testified that a man
told her "he'd seen far out stuff in movies, and that it would be fun
to mentally and physically torture a woman."55
Prostitutes testifying before the 1986 Commission described
how customers had coerced them into acting out pornographic
scenes or depictions.56 A former prostitute testified that a customer
had "held up a pom magazine with a picture of a beaten woman
and said, 'I want you to look like that. I want you to hurt.' ' 57 He
then beat her and burned her with a cigarette.58 Another former
prostitute testified that she and her friends learned how to perform
by "men exposing us to pornography and us [sic] trying to mimic
what we saw." 59
Pornography harms women further by conditioning men to view
women as sexual objects. 6° For example, displaying pornography
in the workplace increases the sexual harassment of women and
52. Id. at 779 (citing Washington, D.C., Hearing, Vol. 1 125).
53. Id. at 827 (citing Testimony to Women Against Pornography, Feb. 1985).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 776 (citing Minneapolis City Council, 1st Sess. 65, 67 (Dec. 1983)).
56. Id. at 789, 798 (citing Public Hearings before Minneapolis City Council, 2nd
Sess. 70, 77, 79 (Dec. 1983)); id. at 793 (citing Washington D.C., Hearing, Vol. II 312A-
1).
57. Id. at 789 (citing Public Hearings before Minneapolis City Council, 2d Sess. 77
(Dec. 1983)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 798 (citing Public Hearings before Minneapolis City Council, 2d Sess. 70);
see also Marianne Wesson, Sex, Lies and Videotape: The Pornographer as Censor, 66
WASH. L. REV. 913, 918 (1991) (discussing women coerced to emulate pornographic
poses).
60. See ANDREA DwORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); Hoffman,
supra note 48; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321
(1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985); Sunstein, supra note 9; Morrison Torrey, We Get the Mes-
sage-Pornography in the Workplace, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 53 (1992).
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inevitably reinforces theirisubordinate status in general.6' Women
working in the presence of pornography are subjected to the endur-
ing stereotype of women as sexual objects. Women exposed to
pornography in the workplace realize that their superiors view them
as mere body parts, which in turn perpetuates their feelings of self-
doubt.62 Dr. Susan Fiske, an expert witness in Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc. 63 stated that "when a superior categorizes
a female employee based on her sex, that superior evaluates her in
terms of characteristics that comport with stereotypes assigned to
women rather than in terms of her job skills and performance. ' 64
Women who are sexually harassed at work suffer from a myri-
ad of emotional, psychological, social and economic harms.65 They
often receive poor evaluations, undeserved reprimands and in-
creased workloads.66 Many witnesses at the hearings before the
1986 Commission stated that they had experienced financial diffi-
culties due to the cost of the medical and mental assistance re-
quired for the injuries they suffered as a result of viewing pornog-
raphy in the workplace.67
Women who report harassment to their superiors may meet
61. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-05
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (referring to the expert testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, professor of
Psychology at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst and an expert in the field of
stereotyping).
62. Id. (referring to the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske).
63. 760 F. Supp. 1486. Robinson, a female employee, sued her employer, Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc., for sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Id. Her complaint focused on the posting of pornography in the workplace. Id. The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that this constituted
a hostile working environment under Title VII and Robinson won her case. Id. The case
is important because it was the first time a court had so held. See infra notes 82-89 and
accompanying text for a further discussion of the case.
64. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1502.
65. See Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages
Control, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 307-08 (1991); see also Robinson, 760 F. Supp.
at 1525.
66. Sharon W. Walsh, Confronting Sexual Harassment at Work, WASH. POST, July 21,
1986 (Business), at 1, 16; see generally Mathews, supra note 65, at 308.
67. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 827-28 (citing Houston Hearing, Vol. II, Anony-
mous, 178Q1-4).
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with additional harassment or a lack of sensitivity to the issue.68
One woman testified to the 1986 Commission that her superior
encouraged her to calm down and just ignore the. harassment. 69
This is evidence of the lack of seriousness and sensitivity toward
sexual harassment in the workplace. It also demonstrates that
women who suffer the harms of pornography lack adequate means
to redress these harms.
The foregoing cases, research studies and testimony before the
1986 Commission indicate that there is a causal connection be-
tween sexually violent pornography and the resulting harms to
women. Women are forced into making pornography. 70 They are
victimized by it at work, making their workplace a sexually hostile
working environment,71 and they are brutalized by men who force
them to mimic it.72 Studies have shown that exposure to pornogra-
phy can cause detrimental effects.73 Although not everyone ex-
posed to pornography is adversely affected, the foregoing accounts
illustrate that pornography can be devastating and that many wom-
en are in need of protection.
II. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Women have successfully sued under Title VII, based on the
creation of a hostile working environment, to rid the workplace of
pornography.74 This approach, however, has a limited reach be-
68. See, e.g., Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1510-12.
69. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 835 (citing Public Hearings before Minneapolis
City Council, Vol. II 88 (Dec. 1983)).
70. See supra part I.A.
71. See supra notes 53-55, 61-69 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 37-39, 50-52, 56-59 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a definition of Title VII. The
relevant part of Title VII reads: "It shall be unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-(1) to ... discharge any individual ... because of such individual's ... sex."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). Pornography is prohibited in the workplace in order
to prevent a sexually hostile working environment, a harm the government has the power
to prevent. Title VII is readily accepted under the First Amendment because most people
assume the work environment can be regulated. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Su-
preme Court indicated its acceptance of Title VII as valid under the First Amendment,
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cause it is applicable only to the work environment and does not
extend liability to producers and distributors of pornography.
The United States Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,75 held that creating a "hostile work environment" is a form
of harassment that violates Title VII.7 6 In Meritor, Vinson, a fe-
male bank employee, brought a sexual harassment suit against the
Meritor Savings Bank under Title VII. 77 She alleged that her su-
perior made unwelcome sexual advances but that she eventually
agreed to have sexual relations with. him out of fear of losing her
job.78 In its decision, the Court focused on whether the advances
were unwelcome and not whether Vinson voluntarily entered into
sexual relations with her superior.79 The Court found that repeated
unwelcome sexual advances created a hostile working environment
which was sufficient for a violation of Title VII.80 According to
the Court, there are five elements required for a cause of action
against an employer: (1) the plaintiff must belong to a protected
category; (2) the plaintiff must be subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) the harassment must be based upon sex; (4) the
harassment must affect a term, privilege or condition of employ-
ment; and (5) the employer must be liable under the theory of
respondeat superior.
8 1
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,82 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that Robinson
had satisfied all of the necessary elements for a claim of sexual
discrimination based upon the existence of a hostile work environ-
ment under Title VH.8 3 The shipyard where Robinson worked was
insisting that the holding in R.A.V. does not encompass Title VII. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546-
47 (1992).
75. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
76. Id. at 66-70.
77. Id. at 60.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 68.
80. Id. at 66-70.
81. Id. at 66-69.
82. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
83. Id. at 1539. Prior to Robinson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., held that a co-employee's display of obsceni-
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extensively decorated with pictures of nude and partially nude
women in the form of magazines, plaques and calendars circulated
as advertising by tool supply companies.8 4 Management condoned
the posting of the pornography and often displayed the materials
openly in its offices.85 Robinson was subjected to depictions of
women that ranged from a dart board with a nipple as the bull's
eye to a drawing of a woman with fluid coming from her genital
area.86 In addition to having to view these displays, Robinson also
suffered severe verbal sexual harassment.8 7 The district court con-
cluded that the presence of nude and partially nude pictures of
women sexualized the work environment to the detriment of all
female employees.8 Robinson, therefore, prevailed on her claim
of hostile work environment harassment based on the posting of
pornography. 9
In Arnold v. City of Seminole, .Arnold, a female police officer,
brought a Title VII action against the city alleging sexual harass-
ment.9t Arnold claimed that her superior had stated repeatedly that
he did not believe in female police officers, and that fellow officers
posted pornographic pictures with her name on them.91 These
pornographic pictures included nude pictures of women with their
ty, coupled with sexually oriented posters, did not result in a hostile working environment.
805 F.2d 611, 622, 627 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). The court
stated that the "sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on the plaintiffs
work environment when considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly
features and commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the
newsstands .. " Id. at 622. Judge Keith dissented from the majority on this point,
stating that "'[s]ociety' in this scenario must primarily refer to the unenlightened; I hardly
believe reasonable women condone the pervasive degradation and exploitation of female
sexuality perpetuated in American culture." Id. at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting).
84. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1493.
85. Id. at 1494.
86. Id. at 1497.
87. Id. at 1498.
88. Id. at 1505. At least one commentator has argued for the expansion of this result
beyond the workplace. Wesson, supra note 59, at 927.
89. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1505. See generally Wesson, supra note 59, at 927
(suggesting that if pornography can be banned from the workplace in the interest of
equality it should be excludable from other public places for the same reason).
90. 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985).
91. Id. at 858.
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genitals exposed, a man and a woman engaging in a sexual act, and
a depiction of a man having sex with a goat which had the plain-
tiff's name written across it.92 The District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma held that Arnold made out a prima facie case
of sexual harassment under Title VII.93
Pornography in the workplace arguably causes more harm than
pornography sold on the street because pornography displayed at
work affects the way women are treated by their colleagues and
superiors. Unlike a newsstand selling pornographic material where
women can cross the street if they are offended, women at work
cannot escape the pornography. Furthermore, many women at
work are a captive and unwilling audience, and often the pornogra-
phy is directed specifically at the female employees. Many women
who are subjected to pornography in the workplace cannot afford
to quit their jobs to search for a better work atmosphere. Because
they depend on their jobs for income to support themselves and
their families, often they must endure all types of hostile working
environments.
Robinson and Arnold further demonstrate that it is often diffi-
cult for women to perform their responsibilities while being ex-
posed to these degrading pictures. Also, these displays of pornog-
raphy often influence their superiors' perceptions of women.94 It
is not difficult to perceive that women may be evaluated differently
than their male counterparts if their superiors are constantly ex-
posed to pictures of naked women during the work day. 95 These
displays not only undermine women's credibility and self-esteem,
but they also send the message that they are not wanted in the
workplace.96
92. Id.
93. Id. at 869.
94. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-05 (M.D.
Fla. 1991); see also Torrey, supra note 60, at 84.
95. Torrey, supra note 60, at 83-84.
96. Id. at 84.
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M. AN HISTORICAL OvERvIEw OF THE MACKINON-DWORKIN Aisn-
PORNOGRAPHY ORDINANCE
A. The Theory Behind The MacKinnon-Dworkin Anti-pornog-
raphy Ordinance
Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin attempted to ad-
dress the harms caused by pornography by drafting a model anti-
pornography Ordinance that provided women with a broad cause
of action against producers and distributors of pornography.97 Por-
nography, according to MacKinnon and Dworkin, perpetuates wom-
en's subordinate status in society.9" They therefore proposed the
model Ordinance as a civil rights measure 99 to address the existing
inequalities between men and women.'°° MacKinnon and Dworkin
argue that women cannot respond to pornography in the market-
place of ideas because pornography silences women, and therefore,
the only way for women to have equal treatment in the debate and
in society at large is by regulating pornography.' 0 ' Dworkin de-
scribes pornography as an "identifiable system of sexual exploita-
tion that hurts women as a class by creating inequality and
abuse,"' 2 and she believes that "[e]quality for women requires
material remedies for pornography, whether pornography is central
to the inequality of women or only one cause of it."' °3 MacKinnon
97. For the complete text of the model Ordinance, see infra App. A. The
MacKinnon-Dworkin Ordinance was first proposed as an amendment to the Minneapolis
Code of Ordinances Relating to Civil Rights. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 13 (ed. note).
The Minneapolis City Council passed the amendment on December 30, 1983, but the
Mayor of Minneapolis, Donald Fraser, vetoed it. Id. The Ordinance was then amended,
but Mayor Fraser vetoed the amended Ordinance as well. Id. However, the Indianapolis
City Council passed a similar Ordinance on April 23, 1984, and Mayor William Hudnut
signed it into law. Id.
98. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 22.
99. Id.
100. MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, supra note 60, at 326; see generally DWORKIN,
supra note 60; MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 3; MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, supra note 60, at 21; Pollard, supra note 9, at 125-26.
101. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 17-19. See also MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue,
supra note 60, at 337-40; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and
Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REV. 793, 809 (1991). For a general discussion of the argu-
ments on both sides of MacKinnon and Dworkin's point of view, see Wesson, supra note
2.
102. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 9.
103. Id. at 22.
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describes pornography as a "central mechanism of sexual subordi-
nation."' 4 In her essay, Against the Male Flood, Dworkin stated
that "[t]he civil rights law would allow women to advance equality
by removing this concrete discrimination and hurting economically
those who make, sell, distribute or exhibit [pornography]."' 5
The goal of the Ordinance was to focus on the harms of por-
nography from a woman's point of view.1°6  According to
MacKinnon and Dworkin, an ordinance based on obscenity"0 7 is
misdirected because obscenity is concerned with prurient interests
rather than the harms pornography causes women.'08 To emphasize
their ideas, the Ordinance's statement of policy begins: "Pornogra-
phy is sex discrimination."' 9 The Ordinance defines pornography
in part as the "graphic sexually explicit subordination of women,
whether in pictures and/or in words .... .""o
Not all feminists, however, support "anti-pornography" reme-
dies."' For example, Nadine Strossen, a Professor of Law at New
York Law School and a founding member of Feminists for Free
Expression, outlines a feminist argument opposing a ban on por-
nography" 2 and proposes that women's rights are disserved by
censoring pornography." 3 She argues that restrictions on pornogra-
104. MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, supra note 60, at 331.
105. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 23.
106. Id. at 22.
107. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating that for a publication
to be obscene it must, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest, must contain
patently offensive depictions or descriptions of specified sexual conduct, and must on the
whole have no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value). See infra part I1I.B.
for a further discussion of obscenity.
108. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 9. Furthermore, Dworkin has stated that pornography
"is physical injury and physical humiliation and physical pain: to the women against
whom it is used after it is made; to the women used to make it." Id. at 11.
109. Id. at 24.
110. Id. For the complete definition of pornography, as defined in the Ordinance,
see infra App. A § 2.
111. See generally Liston, supra note 35, at 416; Pollard, supra note 9, at 137-38;
Wesson, supra note 2, at 847-48.
112. Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pbrnogra-
phy, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1993).
113. See id. at 1140-72 (outlining ten ways in which censorship of pornography
"would adversely affect women's rights and interests").
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phy, such as the anti-pornography Ordinance, would ban many
works that are "valuable to feminists,"' 1 4 such as respected works
of art and literature, as well as "overtly feminist scholarly material
designed to address the same concerns prompting the [Ordi-
nance]."' 5  Such restrictions would also perpetuate "demeaning
stereotypes about women,"' 6 such as "sex is degrading to women,
but not to men""117 and that "women are victims, not sexual ac-
tors. "18 Strossen further points out that the Ordinance would "dis-
tract from constructive approaches to countering anti-female dis-
crimination and violence,""' 9 such as the Family and Medical Leave
Act, government funded day care, and legislation to lift the gag
rule on discussions concerning abortion. 2 ° Strossen's objections to
the model Ordinance pale, however, under an approach centered on
the use of tort remedies: sexually violent pornography would not
be banned but compensation would be provided by the producers
and distributors of the sexually violent pornography for the harm
it produces.
B. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut
Indianapolis adopted a law similar to MacKinnon and
Dworkin's model anti-pornography Ordinance. It was this law that
was successfully challenged on First Amendment grounds by the
American Booksellers Association and civil liberties groups in
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut.121
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
114. Id. at 1141-42 '(discussing the Amici Curiae Briefs of the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Indiana Civil Liberties Union, and the American Civil Liberties
Union of Illinois [hereinafter the ACLU Amici Curiae brief], and American Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)). See also Wesson, supra note 59, at 914.
115. Strossen, supra note 112, at 1141 (quoting the ACLU Amici Curiae Brief at 8a).
116. Id. at 1147.
117.. Id. (quoting Lisa Duggan et al., False Promises: Feminist Antipornography
Legislation in the U.S., in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 142-43 (Varda Burstyn ed., 1985)).
See also Wesson, supra note 59, at 921.
118. Strossen, supra note 112, at 1147.
119. Id. at 1153.
120. See id. at 1141-61.
121. 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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that the definition of pornography in the Ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it permitted only one acceptable view of women,
thereby prohibiting speech that is protected by the First Amend-
ment.122  The fatal infirmity of the Ordinance under the First
Amendment was its definition of pornography. 23  The definition
expressed the only "approved" view of women, making the statute
viewpoint-based 24 and therefore an improper proscription of pro-
tected speech. !25 The court also stated that the definition of por-
nography in the Ordinance did not fall within the definition of
obscenity as set forth in Miller v. California.126 The Seventh Cir-
cuit declined to discuss other problems with the Ordinance that
were addressed by the district court, such as the prior restraint on
speech and the overbreadth of the definition of pornography.'27
The court of appeals might have found the Ordinance constitu-
tional if the definition of pornography proscribed only unprotected
speech, namely obscenity, as set out in Miller. 28 MacKinnon and
Dworkin, however, did not base their Ordinance on the definition
of obscenity because this would restrict pornographic speech on the
basis of a moral wrong instead of restricting it on the basis of the
harm it does to women.129 To MacKinnon and Dworkin, obscenity
law presents pornography as a moral issue, whereas they view
pornography as an issue of harm and equality. 3 °
122. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328.
123. Id. at 332.
124. id. at 328.
125. Id. at 332.
126. Id. at 324-25. See supra note 107 (defining obscenity under Miller).
127. Id. at 332.
128. Id. at 324-25. See also Liston, supra note 35; Bruce A. Taylor, Hard-Core
Pornography: A Proposal for a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 255 (1987-1988);
Martin Karo & Marcia McBrian, Note, The Lessons of Miller and Hudnut: On Proposing
a Pornography Ordinance That Passes Constitutional Muster, 23 U., MICH. J.L. REF. 179
(1989).
129. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 9. There are also conservatives who side with femi-
nists such as MacKinnon and Dworkin. For a complete discussion of the feminist, liberal
and conservative views regarding the suppression of pornography, see Hoffman, supra
note 48, at 510-18; Wesson, supra note 2, at 921-24. See also Liston, supra note 35, at
416-17.
130. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 9. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
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Despite the particular problems of the MacKinnon-Dworkin
Ordinance,' 3' the underlying tort action approach of the Ordinance
has merit. In Hudnut, the Seventh Circuit stated that the section of
the Ordinance creating remedies for harms attributable to pornogra-
phy was salvageable and that "[tIhe First Amendment does not
prohibit redress of all injuries caused by speech."'' 32
C. Butler v. Her Majesty the Queen
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Butler v. Her Majesty the
Queen, recently upheld an anti-pornography law similar to the
MacKinnon-Dworkin Ordinance rejected in Hudnut 33 In Butler,
the owner of a hard-core pornography video and magazine store
was prosecuted under laws prohibiting the manufacture, sale or
distribution of obscene materials' 34  Section 163(8) of Canada's
Criminal Code defines "obscene" as "any publication[,] a dominant
characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex
and any one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime,
horror, cruelty and violence."'' 35 Mr. Butler's defense was that the
materials were protected by the freedom of expression provision in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 36
The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the definition of
obscenity did limit the freedom of expression provision in the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, this limitation was justifi-
able because of the harms women were subjected to by pornogra-
phy.137 The court's rationale for restricting the freedom of expres-
131. See supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
132. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333 (7th Cir. 1985),.aff'd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
133. Butler v. Her Majesty the Queen, 89 D.R.L.4th 449 (Can. 1992).
134. Id. at 454.
135. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 163(8) (1985) (Can.).
136. Butler, 89 D.R.L.4th at 453.
137. Id. at 480 (emphasis added). See also Tamar Lewin, Canada Court Says Por-
nography Harms Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at B7. See generally Made-France
Major, Obscene Comparisons: Canadian and American Attitudes Toward Pornography
Regulation, 19 J. CoNTEMP. L. 51 (1993). But see Jodi A. Kleinick, Comment, Suppress-
ing Violent and Degrading Pornography to "Prevent Harm" in Canada: Butler v. Her
Majesty the Queen, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 627 (1993).
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sion appeared to be the "growing concern that the sexual exploita-
tion of women and children, depicted in publications and films can,
in certain circumstances, lead to 'abject and servile victimiza-
tion.'"138
In Butler the Canadian court, like the Hudnut court, acknowl-
edged the fundamental harm caused to women and society by these
materials. Catharine MacKinnon, in response to the Canadian court
decision stated, "[t]his makes Canada the first place in the world
that says what is obscene is what harms women, not what offends
our values."'
139
IV. TORT THEORIES To BE USED IN HoLDG PODUQmRs AND Dlsmm-
utns LIABLE FoR T E HARS cF SEUALLY VrLENr RUmaRAHY
The growing recognition that pornography harms women has
paved the way for using tort actions against producers and distribu-
tors of sexually violent pornography. At least one circuit judge' 4°
has suggested a method of redressing those harms by stating that
"state regulation [of pornography] by means of tort recovery for
injury directly caused by pornography is appropriate when tailored
to specific harm and not broader than necessary to accomplish its
purpose."'' The intentional infliction of emotional distress has
already provided women with a remedy for their injuries. 42 Other
tort bases for liability, such as strict liability and negligence, should
be made available to victims of sexually violent pornography.
143
Traditional tort objectives would be served by employing the
138. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th at 479 (quoting Regina v. Red Hot Video Ltd., 18
C.C.C.3d 1, 8 (1985)).
139. Lewin, supra note 137, at B7.
140. The Hon. Edith H. Jones, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
141. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1029 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones,
J., concurring and dissenting).
142. See infra part IV.B. These actions, however, do not provide a cause of action
against producers and distributors of the materials.
143. Other authors have addressed this point. See generally Patricia G. Barnes, A
Pragmatic Compromise in the Pornography Debate, I TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 117
(1992); Wesson, supra note 2; Elise M. Whitaker, Note, Pornographer Liability for
Physical Harms Caused by Obscenity and Child Pornography:- A Tort Analysis, 27 GA.
L. REV. 849 (1993).
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proposed tort theories. 'One recognized aim of tort law is to make
victims whole by providing compensation for losses which they
suffer.144 Another goal of tort law is to allocate these losses to
those who are best equipped to prevent the harm. 45 Judge Edith
Jones of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has stated that "allowing damage recovery for tort victims imposes
on its purveyors a responsibility which is insurable, much like a
manufacturer's responsibility to warn against careless use of its
different products."1 46 Instead of prohibiting speech, tort remedies
in these cases would only increase the cost of the creation and dis-
tribution of 'such pornography which could be distributed through
the market place by higher prices. The increase in price would
cover the costs of either insurance or judgments against the purvey-
ors. 1
47
Third-party liability schemes, which are analogous to tort reme-
dies, have been proposed by Congress and a few state legislatures
to provide redress for women who are harmed by pornography.
148
Only one of these bills, however, has been enacted into law. 149 A
144. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971).
145. Id.
146. Herceg v Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1029 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones,
J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Jones appears to be alluding to a market theory of
apportioning the costs of liability to the appropriate parties.
147. See Wesson supra note 2, at 859-60. Both general liability insurance and
product liability insurance exists. If an insurance company could not cover this type of
liability, however, the producers and distributors could self-insure by raising the cost of
their products to ensure that they have the money to defend themselves from such suits.
See generally Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus of Remedy, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 772, 790-93, 825 (1985); Pollard, supra note 9, at 133; Wesson, supra note 2, at
859-60.
148. See supra note 2. See generally Jane M. Whicher, Constitutional and Policy
Implications of "Pornography Victim" Compensation Schemes: A Look at the Potential
Impact of Statutorily-Created Third Party Liability Schemes, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. (Fed-
eral Bar Ass'n) 360 (1993). This same type of theory has also been proposed by Profes-
sor Jonathan B. Mintz. Jonathan B. Mintz, Strict Liability for Commercial Intellect, 41
CATH. U. L. REV. 617 (1992). However, Professor Mintz limits his discussion of strict
liability for commercial intellect to "products whose injury-producing characteristics are
based upon words or ideas, rather than tangible attributes," such as the pictures which are
the focus of this Note. Id. at 620.
149. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-18.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993).-
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tort remedy, however, hinges on proving causation and on proving
sufficient regard for First Amendment considerations.150 Addition-
ally, the plaintiff must show a sufficiently direct connection be-
tween the pornographic image and the act that harmed the plaintiff.
In the case of pornographic pictures or movies, the more similar
the act committed is to the depiction from which it was allegedly
taken,151 the easier it will be to prove causation. It would be even
more helpful for the perpetrator to testify that he received the idea
from the pornography and copied it. Without direct similarity or
the perpetrator's testimony, these tort theories are difficult to use.152
A. First Amendment Analysis of the Proposed Tort Theories
The most common objection to holding producers and distribu-
tors of sexually violent pornography liable under the proposed tort
remedies is that such liability prohibits speech presumably protect-
ed by the First Amendment. The courts have consistently denied
recovery, in media speech tort cases, to plaintiffs who have not met
the standard for incitement set out in Brandenburg v. Ohio. I5 3
However, the Brandenburg test should not apply to the proposed
tort cases involving sexually violent pornography. Judge Jones'
opinion, in Herceg, presents a way of categorizing speech along a
spectrum that has private concern and public concern as its end-
points. 54 She advocates that speech could then be regulated based
150. See Wesson, supra note 2, at 863-65.
151. W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (5th ed.
1984).
152. Wesson, supra, note 59, at 917-19; see also Delaware v. Pennell, 1989 WL
112557 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (discussing the relevance of the defendant's pornographic
video tapes which depicted nipple mutilation ofthe same type from which the decedents
suffered).
153. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Supreme Court, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, stated that
speech could be proscribed if it met the following test (the Brandenburg test), which
requires that the speech be "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to produce such action." id. at 447. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (boy hangs himself while imitating auto-erotic asphyxiation
technique in magazine); Zamara v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (three net-
works sued for desensitizing youngster to violence); Olivia N. v. NBC, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (movie depicting gang rape imitated by viewers).
154. Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly Resulting From
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on where it resided along this spectrum, much as defamation liabil-
ity is already allocated. 155 The speech involved in the media tort
cases, such as Olivia N. v. NBC,156 was creative and would fall
above the level of sexually violent pornography on Judge Jones'
continuum, 57 thereby requiring more First Amendment protection
(e.g. the application of Brandenburg), than sexually violent pornog-
raphy..
Moreover, under the "secondary effects" theory, speech is per-
missibly regulated but not prohibited. 15  The United States Su-
preme Court applied this theory in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.,159 which involved a statute prohibiting adult motion
picture theatres from being located within 1,000 feet of any resi-
dential zone, single or multiple-family dwelling, church, park or
Media Speech: A Comprehensive First Amendment Approach, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 231, 267
(1992).
155. Id. at 265-69. Sims analyzes Judge Jones' analogy between tort liability for the
harm caused by media speech and defamation cases. Id. at 265. The innovation in Judge
Jones' analogy between Herceg and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985), is that different types of speech would be subject to different levels
of protection based on, whether the speech was a matter "of public concern" or "private
concern." Sims, supra note 154, at 267. However, Judge Jones stated that "[m]easured
by this standard Hustler in general . . . deserve[s] limited only [sic] First Amendment
protection" and she condones subjecting such material to tort suits. Herceg, 814 F.2d at
1028-29. As Sims points out, there would remain the problem of determining where upon
the "concern spectrum" the pornography was located. Sims, supra note 154, at 269.
156. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (the speech involved was a television movie that depicted
a gang rape that the defendants re-created).
157. Sims, supra note 154, at 267.
158. The "secondary effects" theory can be justified under the standard set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The
Court held that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." id.
at 376. The Court further established a test (the O'Brien test) which requires: (1) a
government interest that is of sufficient, importance; (2) a regulation that is within the
constitutional power of the Government; (3) that the restriction further the government
interest; (4) the government interest be unrelated to the "suppression of free expression;"
and (5) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms be no greater
"than'is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 376-77. This is usually
referred to as "intermediate level scrutiny."
159. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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school.' 6 The Court found that the statute did not regulate the
content of the movie's speech,1 61 and held that the statute was con-
stitutional under the First Amendment because it was aimed at the
secondary effects of the speech, such as crime rates and property
values, and not at the content of the speech. 62
The proposed tort remedies address the secondary effects of
sexually violent pornography, namely, the harms caused to women
rather than the message of the speech (e.g. sexual arousal). Judge
Jones, again in Herceg, stated that a tort remedy for victims who
were abused or killed because of a specific piece of pornography
"would be unlikely to 'chill' the pornography industry any more
than unfavorable zoning ordinances or the threat of obscenity pros-
ecution has done."'' 6
3
The secondary effect of adult theatres addressed in Renton was
the creation of an atmosphere of crime and violence, which the
state may regulate. The creation of a tort remedy for harms caused
by sexually violent pornography does not rely on an a priori defi-
nition of sexually violent pornography. Actions based on these
theories, therefore, would not fail under the First Amendment, as
did the MacKinnon-Dworkin Ordinance.' 64 The proposed torts
would also provide a remedy, narrowly tailored to a specific harm
of a specific victim.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Women have successfully used the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress to combat the harms of pornography, and
these cases best demonstrate how the proposed tort remedies would
operate. Women in the workplace, as well as one woman outside
160. Id. at 43.
161. Id. at 48.
162. Id.
163. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1029 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones,
J., concurring and dissenting) (footnotes omitted). With the recognition of these harms
by the courts there is potential for an increase in this type of case. However, Judge Jones
disagrees with this argument and points out that only one lawsuit was filed in regard to
the particular article addressed in the Herceg case. Id. at 1026, 1029.
164. See supra part III.B.
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of the workplace, have sued for the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress based on the viewing of pornography.'65 Many
women who sue under Title VII also sue their employer for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress166 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46(1) concludes that "[o]ne who by extreme
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another" is liable for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 
167
In Young v. Stensrude,168 Ms. Young alleged that five male
colleagues showed a pornographic movie in her presence. 169 She
was called into a business meeting by the director of the Medical
Center where she expected to conduct business with her col-
leagues. 70  During the meeting, the defendants showed the movie
Deep Throat after representing to Ms. Young that the movie was
educational.' 7' The Missouri Court of Appeals held that Ms.
Young's case presented a cause of action for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 72 The court stated that the showing of
a pornographic movie to an unsuspecting woman in front of five
men could rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct
which is required to prove a cause of action for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
73
In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,174 two female police offi-
cers in Philadelphia filed a sexual discrimination claim under Title
VII for a hostile work environment. 75 They also sued for the in-
165. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990);
Young v. Stensrude, 664 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Twyman v. Twyman, 855
S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). See infra notes 168-195 and accompanying text for an in-depth
discussion of these cases.
166. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1471; Young, 664 S.W.2d at 264-65.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1) (1965).
168. 664 S.W.2d 263.
169. Id. at 265.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 266.
173. Id. at 265.
174. Kelsey-Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 713 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd
in part, vacated and remanded in part sub. nom. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
175. 895 F.2d at 1471.
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tentional infliction of emotional distress. 76 The plaintiffs, Priscilla
Andrews and Debra Conn, were assigned to the Accident Investiga-
tion Division ("AID") in 1986, but the women worked in separate
squads. 177 Each was the only woman in her squad. 178 The two
were subjected to abusive, obscene and offensive treatment, such
as, being addressed by obscenities, having their personal property
vandalized, being asked questions concerning whom they slept with
to get assigned to AID, and having sexual devices and pornograph-
ic magazines placed in their desk drawers. 179 There also was evi-
dence that pornography was displayed on the inside of a locker that
was often kept open.8 0
The jury ruled in favor of both women on their intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims.' 8' The district court, howev-
er, overturned these findings and granted the city's motion for a
judgment n.o.v. 8 2 The district court ruled that the actions of the
defendants did not rise to the level of outrageousness required by
Pennsylvania law.'83 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit stated that in Pennsylvania, the intentional infliction
of emotional distress is not proven by sexual harassment alone. 184
Sexual harassment claims' in Pennsylvania require an element of
retaliation in order to rise to the level of outrageous conduct, which
neither plaintiff had alleged in this case. 8 5 While the merits of the
Pennsylvania requirement are dubious, the case demonstrates that
the intentional infliction of emotional distress cases based on sexual
harassment are viable.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1471-72.
178. Id. at 1472.
179. Id. at 1472-75.
180. Id. at 1472.
181. Id. at 1471-72.
182. Kelsey-Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 713 F. Supp 760, 774 (E.D. Pa. 1989),
aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,
895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
183. Pennsylvania law requires an element of retaliation for sexual harassment to rise
to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1487.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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In Twyman v. Twyman,186 a woman sued her husband for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress in a divorce action. 187 Ms.
Twyman alleged that her husband had pursued sadomasochistic
bondage activities with her, alleging that it was the only way their
marriage could be saved,18 8 even though he knew that such activity
frightened her because she had been raped at knifepoint. 189 When
their ten-year-old son discovered the husband's bondage magazine
collection, and showed it to his mother, she experienced "utter de-
spair" because the magazines made her realize that bondage.includ-
ed acts worse than she had imagined.'90 The Texas Supreme Court
recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress for
the first time, holding that this tort cause of action could be
brought in a divorce proceeding.' 9 '
After recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, Justice Hecht of the Supreme Court of Texas stated in his
concurring opinion that the struggle for the recognition of this tort
was not a struggle for the acknowledgement of women's rights, but
the recognition of "either a condescending and patronizing view of
women, or a development of the law without particular regard for
gender."1 92 Justice Rose Spector, in her dissent, argued that recog-
nizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does
not present a patronizing view of women. 9 3 Justice Spector assert-
ed that the tort was developed primarily to compensate women for
injuries inflicted by men, and that men therefore have had a strong
interest in marginalizing such claims. 194 She stated that "[t]he law
has often failed to compensate women for recurring harms-serious
though they may be in the lives of women-for which there is no
186. 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App. 1990), rev'd, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
187. 855 S.W.2d at 620.
188. Id. at 620 n.1.
189. Id.
190. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d at 820.
191. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 624. The case has been remanded to determine if Ms.
Twyman's claim satisfied the elements of the tort. Id. at 626.
192. Id. at 640 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
193. Id. at 642-43 (Spector, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 642 (Spector, J., dissenting).
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precise male analogue."' 95
The cases outlined above demonstrate how the tort of intention-
al infliction of emotional distress has been used to combat the
harms of pornography. In a similar fashion, more tort remedies
should be made available to victims of pornography. Additional
tort theories that might be used are strict liability and negligence.
C. Negligence
Based on current First Amendment jurisprudence, it should be
possible to use negligence actions as a basis for holding distributors
and manufacturers of sexually violent pornography liable for the
damages.' 96 In a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving: (1) a legal duty that requires the defendant
to conform to a certain standard of conduct to avoid unreasonable
risks to others; (2) a breach of this duty; (3) a sufficiently close
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the harm
suffered; and (4) actual damage. 19 7
The defendant's duty and proximate cause both turn on the
notion of foreseeability. A plaintiff must establish that the harm
caused by the defendant's actions was foreseeable. 98  As society
more readily accepts that pornography has detrimental affects,199
there is an increase in the expectation that harm will result from
sexually violent pornography. Canada has already recognized this
problem"° and although the U.S. has not yet accepted this connec-
195. Id. at 642-43 (Spector, J., dissenting) (quoting Martha Chamallas & Linda K.
Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814
(1990)). See also Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues
in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989).
196. The Supreme Court permits recovery based on negligence in defamation actions
brought by private individuals. See, e.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The
Court is likely to permit such an action under the proposed tort remedies where the
restriction is indirect so long as the necessary elements for liability are met.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
198. W. PAGE KEETON E7 AL, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 281 (5th
ed. 1984).
199. See supra part I.
200. See supra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.
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tion, it is moving closer.
It is foreseeable that people will react to and be influenced by
what they read.20 1 Pornography has played a part in many crimes.
For example, Ted Bundy, suspected of killing over fifty women,
described in his last interview his addiction to sexually violent
pornography and the influence it had on his criminal behavior.20 2
Moreover, the 1986 Commission offers further proof that people
reenact scenes from pornographic books and movies.20 3
The defendant's duty in this type of situation does not arise
through a preexisting connection of the parties, such as a contractu-
al relationship between the parties. Rather, the duty arises from the
foreseeability of the crime.2° Whether or not a duty exists is an
"expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection." 20 5 Given the potentially high degree of foreseeability
of the harm and the regulable nature of this speech, courts could
impose a duty to take reasonable precautions to avoid creating this
risk of harm to others.2t 6
An intervening act by a third party may cut off proximate
cause, in this case from the producer or distributor, unless the de-
fendant's "negligent conduct ... creates or increases the foresee-
able risk of harm though the intervening of another force, and it is
a substantial factor in causing the harm, [in which case] such inter-
vention is not a superseding cause."20 7 Considering the growing
literature on crimes based on pornography involving third parties,
proving the increase in the likelihood of harm through the interven-
201. See Whitaker, supra note 143, at 880-82 (discussing how advertisers rely on
consumers' reaction to the media, as well as other cases where defendants have testified
that they reenacted what they saw and heard in movies and songs).
202. Mark Nichols, A Killer's Final Hour, MACLEAN'S, Feb. 6, 1989, at 54.
203. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 25; see also supra notes 32-33, 37-39, 50-52, 55-
59 and accompanying text.
204. See Whitaker, supra note 143, at 882-87 (for a more in-depth look at the con-
cept of "duty").
205. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 325-26 (4th ed. 1971).
206. See Wesson, supra note 2; Whitaker, supra note 143.
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442A (1965).
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ing force of a third party should be easier. 8
To satisfy the requirements of negligence a plaintiff must also
prove cause in fact. A victim who has a claim must prove a causal
connection between the producer's or distributor's product and the
actual harm suffered. This is necessary to assuage a court's wor-
ries that numerous plaintiffs would bring suit against every piece
of pornography that offended them.2°9 The burden of showing such
a causal link should be high. The plaintiff must prove to the jury
that the third party would not have committed the crime "but for"
the pornography.210
The negligence standard also requires proof that the defendant
breached his duty.21' The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
conduct did not meet that of a "reasonable man of ordinary pru-
dence," the paradigm on which the "breach" element is based.212
The last prong requires that the plaintiff suffer actual damage.
Again, this requirement ensures that women will not sue producers
and distributors because they are offended by magazines at a news-
stand. However, "[v]ictims of sex crimes can easily establish that
they suffered serious and devastating injuries. 213
D. Two Theories of Strict Liability
1. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
Strict liability should also provide relief for women harmed by
sexually violent pornography. Under a theory of strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities, liability is imposed on "[o]ne who
carries on an abnormally dangerous activity. 2 4 The liability is
limited, however, to the possibility of the harm which makes the
208. See supra part 1, discussing research reports and the FINAL REPORT; see also notes
2, 3, 25, 59 and accompanying text.
209. This was one of the defects of the MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-pornography
Ordinance because of the second and third causes of action. See infra Appendix A.
210. KEETON, supra note 198, § 32, at 174.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
212. KEETON, supra note 198, § 41, at 266.
213. Whitaker, supra note 143, at 898.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1965).
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activity abnormally dangerous. The underlying theory of strict
liability is that those who engage in certain dangerous activities do
so at their own risk and are liable for any resulting damages." i
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 sets forth six factors
to be considered in determining whether an activity is "abnormally
dangerous.'216 They are:
,(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
:person, ,land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the
harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to elimi-
nate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent
to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e)
inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the commu-
nity is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.217
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelley v. R. G. Industries21 8
carved out a new exception to strict liability in order to hold manu-
facturers of "Saturday Night Specials" liable to third parties injured
by these weapons.219 The court stated that the common law is
"subject to judicial modification' 22 ° which permits "new actions
and remedies where we have concluded that such course was justi-
fied." 22' The court stated that imposing strict liability on the manu-
facturers of "Saturday Night Specials" would not be contrary to
public policy as set forth by the Maryland Legislature.222 There-
fore, the court recognized a "separate, limited area of strict liability
for the manufacturers ... of 'Saturday Night Specials"' based on
the presumption that the manufacturer of such a product knows or
ought to know that the chief use of the product is for criminal
activity.223
215. Id. cmt. d.
216. Id. § 520.
217. Id.
218. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
219. Id. at 1159.
220. Id. at 1150-51.
221. Id. at 1151.
222. Id. at 1153.
223. Id. at 1159.
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In order to employ a strict liability theory to prosecute produc-
ers and distributors of sexually violent pornography, an exception
would have to be made, premised on an analysis similar to that in
Kelley.224 The underlying public policy theory in Kelley was based
on Congressional Acts, hearings, reports, and the Maryland Legisla-
tive Acts.225 These materials found that problems with the misuse
of "Saturday Night Specials" in crimes and violence in the United
States had been documented by the Senate Judiciary Subcommit-
tee 16 and that they were the predominant firearms used in
crimes.227 The 1986 Commission's Report provides a similar basis
on which to fashion an exception to strict liability for producers
and distributors of sexually violent pornography,228 concluding that
pornography leads to greater violence towards women.229
By its definition, strict liability requires a high degree of risk
of harm to a victim and a likelihood that the resulting harm will be
great.23° Studies by psychologists and communication experts indi-
cate that violent pornography increases aggression against wom-
en. ' The mass circulation of pornography is also closely correlat-
ed with the incidence of reported rapes.232 Furthermore, the 1986
Commission stated that exposure to sexually violent material leads
to greater violence against women.233
The third consideration requires that even due care on the de-
fendant's part would not eliminate the risk of harm.234 The Re-
statement comment about this third consideration states that when
reasonable precautions cannot make the activity entirely safe, the
danger of the activity should be regarded as abnormal. 235 There
224. Id.
225. See id. at 1151-59.
226. Id. at 1156 (citing S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-80 (1968)).
227. Id. at 1157 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 21, 27,030 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh,
Subcommittee Chairman)).
228. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 25.
229. Id. at 1005.
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965).
231. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 40.
233. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 1005.
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965).
235. Id. cmt. h.
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does not appear to be a reasonable way that pornographers could
exercise due care in making their products that would lessen or
eliminate the harm to its victims. It is impossible to determine in
advance which buyers of sexually violent pornography will use the
pornography as a source of acting out their fantasies on a woman
and which buyers will use the pornography only for sexual stimu-
lation.
The fourth consideration examines the extent to which the par-
ticular activity is not a matter of common usage.236 If the activity
is "customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by
many people in the community" then the activity is a matter of
common usage.237 An example that is given as a common usage
is driving automobiles, and one that is not common usage is blast-
ing.238 This consideration favors the victim. There is not such a
proliferation of sexually violent pornography producers and distrib-
utors that the production and distribution of sexually violent por-
nography could be considered common usages.
The last consideration appropriate to the present analysis is the
extent to which the dangerous attributes of pornography outweigh
the societal value in distributing and producing it.239 Almost any
victim's story points out that the value of sexually violent pornog-
raphy to society is outweighed by the harms that the victims have
suffered. The value of sexually violent pornography as a sex aid
or arousal mechanism cannot be said to outweigh the need for
prevention of sexually violent crimes against women.
2. Strict Products Liability
Strict liability also exists under products liability laws. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A explains that "[o]ne who
sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
236. Id. § 520.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer..
S.,240 There are four basic elements to this cause of action: (1)
the product was in a defective condition when it left the possession
of the seller; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous to the
user; (3) the defect caused the injuries; and (4) the product was
expected and did reach the consumer without a substantial change
in its condition.24'
In a caveat, the Restatement provides that "[t]he Institute ex-
presses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in this Section
may not apply... to harm to persons other than users or consum-
ers." 242 Also, the Comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A do not define "defective condition" apart from "unreason-
ably dangerous" and therefore the term "defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous" is used as a single term. Two tests are used by
the courts to determine whether the product is unreasonably dan-
gerous: the consumer expectation test and the risk-benefit test.
a. Consumer Expectation Test
As explained in the Restatement, the consumer expectation test
considers whether the product is "dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the commu-
nity as to its characteristics. 243 The producers and distributors of
pornography sell a product which is arguably "dangerous... be-
yond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consum-
er. '' 24 Consider the man who wrote to the Commission to say that
pornography's effects on him were devastating.245 Surely most
people would not purchase sexually violent pornography if they
believed it would change their lives so as to leave them "complete-
ly devastated., 246
240. Id. § 402A.
241. Id.
242. id.
243. id. cmt. i.
244. Id.
245. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 794 (citing an Anonymous Letter to the 1986
Commission).
246. Id.
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b. The Risk-Benefit Test
The risk-benefit test provides a stronger theory for holding
producers and distributors of sexually violent pornography liable.
The premise of this test is that a product is unreasonably dangerous
only if the product's risks outweigh its benefits.247 In addition, the
plaintiff has to prove the four elements listed above. However, in
some jurisdictions the manufacturer bears the burden of proving
that the product's benefits outweigh the risks. 248 A plaintiff should
be able to prove that the risks of sexually violent pornography
outweigh the benefits to society through the use of studies, the
1986 Commission Report and court decisions recognizing the
harms of pornography.
Under the risk-benefit test the strongest argument against the
use of strict liability to prosecute producers and distributors of
sexually violent pornography is that the plaintiff cannot prove that
the product was defective. 249 This is where an expansion of the
regular notion of the tort comes into play. If the courts would
consider the product defective if its risks outweigh its benefits to
society, then the plaintiff may be able to prove that the product is
defective.
CONCLUSION
Sexually violent pornography presents a serious problem to
women in our society. Along with other physical harms, it also
degrades and dehumanizes them. The fear of what might be en-
compassed or censored by a ban on pornography, however, is un-
derstandable. A practical solution, therefore, is to hold producers
and distributors of sexually violent pornography liable for the
harms their products cause, just as we hold liable manufacturers of
other abnormally dangerous or hazardous products. Producers and
distributors of pornography could insure themselves against this
risk and pass the costs on to consumers. This solution would pre-
247. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J.
825 (1973).
248. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978).
249. Whitaker, supra note 143, at 885-86.
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vent complete censorship, yet allow women to recover for their nu-
merous injuries caused by sexually violent pornography.
Elizabeth Kirby Fuller
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APPENDIX A
MODEL ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY LAW
SECTION 1. STATEMENT OF POLICY
Pornography is sex discrimination. It exists in [place], posing
a substantial threat to the health, safety, welfare, and equality of
citizens in the community. Existing [state and] federal laws are
inadequate to solve these problems in [place].
Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and subor-
dination based on sex that differentially harms women. The harm
of pornography includes dehumanization, sexual exploitation,
forced sex, forced prostitution, physical injury, and social and sexu-
al terrorism and inferiority presented as entertainment. The bigotry
and contempt it promotes, with the acts of aggression it fosters,
diminish opportunities for equality of rights in employment, educa-
tion, property, public accommodations and public services; create
public and private harassment, persecution and denigration; pro-
mote injury and degradation such as rape, battery, child sexual
abuse, and prostitution and inhibit just enforcement of laws against
these acts; contribute significantly to restricting women in particu-
lar from full exercise of citizenship and participation in public life,
including in neighborhoods; damage relations between the sexes;
and undermine women's equal exercise of rights to speech and
action guaranteed to all citizens under the Constitutions and laws
of the United States and [place, including state].
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS
1. Pornography is the graphic sexually explicit subordination
of women through pictures and/or words that also includes one or
more of the following: (i) women are presented dehumanized as
sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (ii) women are presented
as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (iii) women are
presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in be-
ing raped; or (iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or
cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (v) women are
presented in postures or positions of sexual submission, servility,
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or display; or (vi) women's body parts-including but not limited
to vaginas, breasts, or buttocks-are exhibited such that women are
reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are presented as whores by
nature; or (viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects
or animals; or (ix) women are presented in scenarios of degrada-
tion, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised,
or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
2. The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of
women in (1) above is pornography for purposes of this law.
SECTION 3. UNLAWFUL PRACTICES
1. Coercion into pornography: It shall be sex discrimination
to coerce, intimidate, or fraudulently induce (hereafter, "coerce")
any person, including transsexuals, into performing for pornogra-
phy,, which injury may date from any appearance or sale of any
product(s) of such performance(s). The maker(s), seller(s), exhibi-
tor(s), and/or distributor(s) of said pornography may be sued for
damages and for an injunction, including to eliminate the product(s)
of the performance(s) from the public view.
Proof of one or more of the following facts or conditions shall
not, without more, negate a finding of coercion: (i) that the person
is a woman; or (ii) that the person is or has been a prostitute; or
(iii) that the person has attained the age of majority; or (iv) that the
person is connected by blood or marriage to anyone involved in or
related to the making of the pornography; or (v) that the person has
previously had, or been thought to have had, sexual relations with
anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the making of
the pornography; or (vi) that the person has previously posed for
sexually explicit pictures with or for anyone, including anyone
involved in or related to the making of the pornography at issue;
or (vii) that anyone else, including a spouse or other relative, has
given permission on the person's behalf; or (viii) that the person
actually consented to a use of the performance that is changed into
pornography; or (ix) that the person knew that the purpose of the
acts or events in question was to make pornography; or (x) that the
person showed no resistance or appeared to cooperate actively in
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the photographic sessions or in the events that produced the por-
nography; or (xi) that the person signed a contract, or made state-
ments affirming a willingness to cooperate in the production of
pornography; or (xii) that no physical force, threats, or weapons
were used in the making of the pornography; or (xiii) that the per-
son was paid or otherwise compensated.
2. Trafficking in pornography: It shall be sex discrimination
to produce, sell, exhibit, or distribute pornography, including
through private clubs.
(i) City, state, and federally funded public libraries or private
and public university and college libraries in which pornography is
available for study, including on open shelves but excluding special
display presentations, shall not be construed to be trafficking in
pornography.
(ii) Isolated passages or isolated parts shall not be actionable
under this section.
(iii) Any woman has a claim hereunder as a woman acting
against the subordination of women. Any man, child, or transsexu-
al who alleges injury by pornography in the way women are in-
jured by it also has a claim.
3. Forcing pornography on a person: It shall be sex discrimi-
nation to force pornography on a person, including a child or trans-
sexual, in any place of employment, education, home, or public
place. Only the perpetrator. of the force or -responsible institution
may be sued.
4. Assault of physical attack due to pornography: It shall be
sex discrimination 'to assault, physically attack, or injure any per-
son, including child or transsexual, in a way that is directly caused
by specific pornography. The perpetrator of the assault or attack
may be sued for damages and enjoined where appropriate. The
maker(s), distributor(s), seller(s), and/or exhibitor(s) may also be
sued for damages and for an injunction against the specific pornog-
raphy's further exhibition, distribution, or sale.
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SECTION 4. DEFENSES
1. It shall not be a defense that the defendant in an action
under this law did not know or intend that the materials were por-
nography or sex discrimination.
2. No damages or compensation for losses shall be recoverable
under Sec. 3(2) or other than against the perpetrator of the assault
or attack in Sec. 3(4) unless the defendant knew or had reason to
know that the materials were pornography.
3. In actions under Sec. 3(2) or other than against the perpetra-
tor of the assault or attack in Sec. 3(4), no damages or compensa-
tion for losses shall be recoverable against maker(s) for pornogra-
phy made, against distributor(s) for pornography distributed, against
seller(s) for pornography sold, or against exhibitor(s) for pornogra-
phy exhibited, prior to the effective date of this law.
SECTION 5. ENFORCEMENT
1. Civil action: Any person aggrieved by violations of this
law may enforce its provisions by means of a civil action. No
criminal penalties shall attach for any violation of the provisions of
this law. Relief for violation of this act may include reasonable
attorney's fees.
2. Injunction: Any person who violates this law may be
enjoined except that:
(i) In actions under Sec. 3(2), and other than against the perpe-
trator of the assault or attack under Sec. 3(4), no temporary or
permanent injunction shall issue prior to a final judicial determina-
tion that the challenged activities constitute a violation of this law.
(ii) No temporary or permanent injunction shall extend beyond
such material(s) that, having been described with reasonable speci-
ficity by the injunction, have been determined to be validly pro-
scribed under this law.
SECTION 6. SEVERABILITY
Should any part(s) of this law be found legally invalid, the
remaining part(s) remains valid. A judicial declaration that any
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part(s) of this law cannot be applied validly in a particular manner
or to a particular case or category of cases shall not affect the va-
lidity of that part(s) as otherwise applied, unless such other applica-
tion would clearly frustrate the [legislative body's] intent in adopt-
ing this law.
SECTION 7. LIMITATION OF ACTION
Actions under this law must be filed within one year of the
alleged discriminatory acts.

